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God Bless the Child: 
Poor Children, Parens Patriae, and a State 
Obligation to Provide Assistance 
KAY P. KINDRED• 
The face of poverty has changed considerably in this country over the past 
twenty-five years.1 In the early 1970s the aged comprised the largest group of 
poor people, but in the 1990s, children have displaced the elderly as the 
poorest group. One in five children in this country-14.6 million-is poor. In 
1992 more than one out of every five American children younger than eighteen 
lived in a family whose income was below the poverty line. One in every four 
children under six years of age is poor, nearly double the rates for adults ages 
eighteen to sixty-four. Twenty-seven percent of children under age three live in 
poverty. The number of poor children younger than eighteen years of age has 
increased by five million-from 9.6 million to 14.6 million since 1973-while 
the poverty rate of children has increased by one-half-from 14.4% to 21.9%. 
Approximately one in every two poor children lives in extreme poverty, in 
families whose income falls below half the federal poverty line. The average 
poor family with children in 1992 had a total income of $7,541 or $5.40 per 
person per day, or $37.80 per person per week.2 
A variety of reasons have been advanced for the increase in the child 
poverty rate: (1) the declining value of the minimum wage means that many 
people work, but remain below the poverty level; (2) unemployment rates do 
• Kay P. Kindred is an Assistant Professor of Law and the Deputy Director of the 
Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the College of William and Mary School of Law. An 
earlier version of this paper served as the basis of a presentation at a conference on 
children's rights held at Temple University School of Law in September, 1995. 
1 The official definition of poverty used by the U.S. Census Bureau for annually 
assessing the number of poor Americans sets poverty thresholds that take into account total 
family income, family size, and an adjustment each year for inflation in consumer prices. 
According to the official government definition of poverty, a family of four with less than 
$14,335 of annual cash income in 1992 was considered poor. However, poor families' 
incomes usually fall significantly below the official poverty threshold-an average of $6,289 
below the threshold in 1992. The official poverty definition does not consider geographic 
variations in cost of living; does not account for the value of "in-kind" help such as food 
stamps and housing assistance received by families, or for the impact of federal taxes, or for 
income lost due to high medical bills, child care, or other expenses. See ARLoc SHERMAN, 
WASTING AMERicA'S FuTuRE: THE CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FuND REPoRT ON THE COSTS Qp 
CHILDPoVERTY3, 7 (1994) [hereinafter, CHILDREN'SDEPENSEF'uND). 
2Jd. atxvi. 
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not reflect the growing number of employed people who work only part-time 
because full-time work is unavailable; (3) high unemployment persists in the 
inner cities particularly among minorities and young workers; (4) the 
increasing numbers of female-headed, single-parent households are particularly 
burdened in overcoming poverty; and, (5) inadequate government welfare 
programs fail to raise many families out ofpoverty.3 
As a matter of social and economic policy, the family is regarded not only 
as the appropriate institution for provision of the love and affection necessary 
for the proper development of the child, but also as the institution responsible 
for provision of the economic and material needs of the child. 4 Current 
constitutional theory comports with this premise. The Supreme Court has long 
interpreted the Constitution as creating a zone of privacy that insulates families 
from state intrusion.5 The constitutional right to family integrity encompasses 
the autonomy of adults in marriage and in family matters such as procreation 
and childrearing. 6 It protects the right of parents to the care and companionship 
of their children and the corresponding right of children in their parents. 7 
Although the Court has repeatedly upheld a right to family privacy, it has not 
construed the Constitution to impose on government the obligation to fund the 
3 CHILDREN's DEFENSE FuND, supra note 1, at 5; see also Daan Braveman, Orildren, 
Poverty and State Constitutions, 38 EMoRY L.J. 577, 577-85 (1989); Peter B. Edelman, 
Toward a Comprehensive Antipoverty Strategy: Getting Beyond the Silver Bullet, 81 Goo. 
LJ. 1697, 1722-24 (1993). 
Contrary to popular stereotypes, although past and continuing racial discrimination in 
employment, housing, and education contribute to making Black and Latino children more 
likely to be poor than non-Latino White children, the number of poor non-Latino White 
children (6.0 million) is considerably larger than the number of poor Black children (4.9 
million) or poor Latino children (3.1 million). In addition, more poor children live outside 
cities-in suburban and nonmetropolitan smaller cities and rural areas than in major cities. 
Further, poor families no longer tend to be large families; the average poor family with 
children consists of an average of 2.2 children, only slightly larger than the average of 1.9 
children in all families. CHILDREN's DEFENSE FuND, supra note 1, at 5. 
4 See DUNCAN LINDsEY, THBWBLFARBOFCHH..DREN 322 {1994); see e.g., VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 63.1-249 to 63.1-274.10 (Michie 1995); N.Y. Jun. § 413 (McKinney 1995). 
5 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-85 (1965) {Harlan, J. and White, 
J., concurring) (recognizing a limited substantive due process fundamental right to privacy). 
6 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
15~56 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,4~85 (1965); Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 53~35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 391-92 (1923); 
see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977) (plurality decision) 
(recognizing a substantive due process fundamental right to make choices concerning family 
living arrangements). 
1 See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 385 (1979); Stanley v. lllinois, 405 U.S. 
645, 647-52 (1972). 
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exercise of that right.8 Irnplicit in the Court's interpretation of family privacy is 
the notion that family integrity is best protected when the family is shielded 
from state interlerence, even when that interlerence is beneficent. Thus, 
prevailing constitutional doctrine does not recognize a right of families to state 
assistance, even when such assistance is necessary to protect and maintain 
family integrity. 
Under the common law doctrine of parens patriae the state has an 
obligation to ensure the safety and well-being of children. Despite the weight 
imparted in both law and social policy to the parent-child relationship and to 
the values of family privacy, the state, in the proper exercise of its power as 
parens patriae, can require parents to provide proper food, clothing, shelter 
and medical care to their children. 9 Parental failure in that regard can lead to 
the removal of children from their parents' care. 
Current constitutional theory balances the right to family integrity against 
the state's power as parens patriae by characterizing that right as one of 
noninterference by the state in family matters absent a showing of compelling 
state interest in preventing criminal conductiO or protecting children from 
parental harm. II State statutes that allow for the removal of children from their 
parents for neglect are considered proper manifestations of the exercise of that 
power.J2 
In this Article, I argue that poor parents who are willing, but economically 
unable, to provide proper care for their children are entitled to some minimum 
level of state assistance grounded in the constitutional right to family integrity. 
The right to family integrity, when coupled with the state's power as parens 
patriae, creates an affirmative obligation on the state to provide income 
assistance to impoverished families when necessary to protect the welfare of the 
children and maintain the family intact. 
This Article is divided into five parts. Part I reviews the limitations to a 
right to state assistance under current constitutional doctrine. Part ll discusses 
development of the family privacy right and the parens patriae doctrine. Part 
m considers how the exercise of state authority to protect needy children has 
tended to operate in such a way as to undermine the integrity of impoverished 
families to the detriment of poor children. The state has an affirmative 
8 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 
472-74 (1977) (holding that a state cannot create obstacles to prevent a woman from 
exercising her freedom of choice concerning abortion; however, there is no obligation on 
the state to provide equal funds for indigent childbirths and abortions). 
9 See supra text accompanying note 4. 
10 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878). 
11 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255-56 (1978). 
12 See i'!fra note 50. 
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obligation to provide some minimum level of assistance to poor families arising 
from the intersection of the family privacy right and the state's common law 
duty as parens patriae, when maintaining the family unit is in the best interest 
of the child. Finally, Parts N and V examine the benefit of revisiting the issue 
of an assistance entitlement for poor families in light of some current proposals 
for welfare reform. 
I. DocTRINAL LIMITATIONS ON A THEoRY OF 
EN'I'ITLEMENT TO MINIMuM SUPPORT 
Consideration of the possibility of a constitutionally-based right to 
entitlements-nutrition, shelter, health care-is not new. During the past 
twenty-five years, legal scholars have debated whether the federal Constitution 
supports the notion of judicially enforceable substantive rights that would 
compel expenditure of government funds to address the economic needs of the 
poor.13 Such arguments run counter to traditional precepts that view the 
Constitution as a charter of negative rights that restrain government from 
certain conduct, rather than a charter of positive rights that impose affirmative 
obligations upon government to act.14 The Supreme Court has adhered to the 
negative rights philosophy and, thus, has rejected arguments asserting an 
13 See Frank I. Michelman, 'I'M Supreme Court, 1968 Tenn-Foreword: On 
Protecling the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969) 
(suggesting that government has an affirmative duty under the Constitution to provide for 
minimum support for the poor); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERicAN CONSTITUI'IONAL 
LAw§ 11-4. (1978); Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Rejleclions ofthe Constitutional Jumce 
of livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1103, 1108-10 (1986); Peter B. Edelman, 'I'M Next 
Century of Our Constitution: Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HAsTINGs LJ. 1, 3 
(1987); Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 659, 659; Charles A. Reich, 'I'M New Property, 13 YALELJ. 733,783-85 (1964) 
(arguing that welfare rights should be viewed as property and, as such, should be entitled to 
the same protections as other property rights); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and 
Social Welfare: 'I'M Emerging Legal Issues, 14 YALE LJ. 1245, 1252-53 (1965). But see 
Robert H. Bork, 'I'M Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 
WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 695-96. 
14 "[T]he Constitution is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties; it tells the 
state to let people alone. It does not require the federal government or the state to provide 
services." Jackson v. City ofJoliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1049 (1984); see DeShaney v. Wmnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 
189, 196 (1989). For an insightful critique of the negative rights view of the Constitution, 
see Susan Bandes, 'I'M Negative Constitution: A Oitique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271 (1990); 
Michael J. Gerhardt, 'I'M Ripple Effects of Slaughter-House: A Oitique of a Negative Rights 
Vzewofthe Constitution, 43 VAND. L. REv. 409 (1990). 
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affinnative governmental obligation under the federal Constitution to expend 
funds to provide resources for the poor ,15 
Arguments asserting federal constitutional rights to meet the needs of the 
poor have rested on equal protection or due process grounds. In Goldberg v. 
Kelly, 16 the Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires that a pretermination evidentiary hearing be held when 
welfare benefits are to be discontinued. Although the Court accepted the notion 
of welfare benefits as property, 17 and found that "[s]uch benefits are a matter 
of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them, "18 it did not 
reach the question of the existence of an affinnative duty on the state under the 
Constitution to provide some minimal degree of assistance. 
In Dandridge v. Wzlliams, 19 decided only two weeks after Goldberg, the 
Court considered the validity of the method by which the state of Maryland 
distributed benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
Program (AFDC)20 under an equal protection analysis. According to AFDC 
procedures, each state determines the standard of need for each eligible family. 
Maryland had adopted a "maximum grant" program by which it would provide 
grants to most families in full based on the computed standard of need, but with 
a ceiling for the total amount any one family could receive. The standard of 
need was based on the number of children in the family and the circumstances 
under which the family lived. The standard of need increased with each 
additional person in the household, but the increments became proportionally 
smaller and the aggregate could not exceed the maximum limit. 21 
The plaintiffs were all members of large families whose calculated standard 
of need exceeded the maximum grant they actually received. They argued that 
the maximum grant limitation operated to discriminate against them based on 
the size of their families in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs argued that the maximum grant denied 
benefits to younger children in a large family. Moreover, they argued that in 
limiting the amount of money any single household could receive, the State's 
15 See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3051-53 
(1989); Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360,368 (1988); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,316-17 
(1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-70 (1977); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30-34 (1973). 
16 397 u.s. 254, 264 (1970). 
17 "It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 'property' than 
a 'gratuity.'" Id. at 262 n.8. 
18 Id. at 262. 
19 397 u.s. 471 (1970). 
20 42 u.s.c. § 601-617 (1994). 
21 Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473-75. 
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maximum grant regulation encouraged the breakdown of families as parents of 
large families "farmed out" their children to live with relatives.22 
Applying a rational basis test,23 the Court concluded that Maryland's 
maximum grant regulation did not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 
Although the Court acknowledged that the maximum grant program resulted in 
the per capita diminution of benefits to children in large families, 24 and that the 
system may provide incentive for a parent to send a child away from the 
immediate family to live with relatives, 25 it found no constitutional violation. 
The Supreme Court held that in matters of social welfare programs, as with 
economic regulation of business and industry, the Constitution imposes only 
limited restraint. Although "[t]he administration of public welfare assistance 
... involves the most basic economic needs of impoverished human beings, "26 
if the classification made by the state has "some reasonable basis," courts must 
defer to legislative and administrative judgments in the allocation of public 
assistance, notwithstanding the resulting system may be unjust or inhumane. 27 
Six years later, in Lavine v. Milne,28 the Supreme Court expressed more 
definitively its position on a constitutional entitlement to minimum subsistence. 
A New York welfare statute provided that anyone who voluntarily terminated 
employment would be disqualified from receipt of benefits for a period of 
seventy-five days following the termination. 29 A person who applied for 
assistance within the seventy-five days after voluntarily terminating 
employment would be deemed to have terminated employment for the purpose 
of qualifying for assistance. 30 The statute placed the burden of presenting 
evidence to the contrary on the applicant. The lower court held in favor of the 
plaintiffs, finding that the statutory presumption that an applicant who 
voluntarily terminated his employment did so for a wrongful reason violated 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.31 The Supreme Court reversed.32 
Although under the facts of the case it was not necessary for the Court to 
address the broader question of a constitutional right to minimum support, the 
22 /d. at 476-n. 
23 "In the areas of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal 
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect." ld. at 
485. 
24 /d. at 478. 
25 /d. at 479-80. 
26 /d. at 485 (emphasis added). 
27 /d. at 485, 487. 
2s 424 u.s. 5n (1976). 
29 Id. at 578-79. 
30 ld. at 579. 
31 ld. at 581-82. 
32 Id. at 582. 
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Court, in an opinion by Justice White, reached out to do so. Citing Dandridge, 
the Court said "[w]elfare benefits are not a fundamental right, and neither the 
state nor federal government is under any sort of constitutional obligation to 
guarantee minimum levels of support. "33 This pronouncement seemed to 
effectively close the door on arguments for a minimum assistance entitlement. 
II. THE RIGHT OFF AMILY INTEGRITY AND THE PARENS PATRJ.A..E 
DocTRINE: WHERE CONSTITUITONAL AND 
COMMON LAW DocTRINE MEET 
A. An Intersection of Competing Principles 
Freedom of choice in marriage and family relationships is a central tenet of 
our jurisprudence.34 Since its early due process cases dealing with the 
education and rearing of children, 35 the Supreme Court has demonstrated 
repeatedly that matters incident to marriage and to the establishment and 
maintenance of family life are fundamental and, thus, entitled to constitutional 
protection. 36 Personal choice with respect to decisions to marry, 37 to 
procreate,38 to bear children,39 to choose family living arrangements,40 and to 
direct the education and upbringing of children41 are among the rights 
33 1d. at 584 n.9. 
34 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-501 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(zoning ordinance that limited occupancy of a dwelling unit to members of a statutorily 
defined "family" was held unduly restrictive of the right to choose family living 
arrangements). Moore interprets the line of Supreme Court cases dating from Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), as establishing the constitutional right to freedom of choice 
in matters of marriage and family life. See generally JOHN NOWAK & RONALD R<mJNDA, 
CoNsTrrurloNALl.AW§14.28 (5th ed. 1995). 
35 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390 (1923). 
36 "(.T]be custody, care, and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose 
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither 
supply nor binder ••• [There exists a] private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citations omitted). 
37 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Vrrginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
38 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Skinner v. Oklaboma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942). 
39 Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
40 Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
41 WISCOnsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
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protected by the Constitution. Further, the Constitution protects not only the 
individual rights of parents from arbitrary governmental intrusion, but also the 
privacy right of the family unit itself.42 
The state cannot intervene in matters of the family without establishing a 
compelling interest to do so, but the family is not beyond regulation in the 
public interest. 43 When acting to protect the general welfare of children, the 
state has wide latitude to restrict parental control.44 This state power, known as 
the parens patriae doctrine, in essence, gives the state authority to serve as a 
substitute parent and ultimate protector of children's interests.4S 
(1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
42 See Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("[F]reedom 
of personal choice in matters of .•• family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); Stanley v. Dlinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 
(1972) ("The Court has frequently emphasized the importance of the family. The rights to 
conceive and to raise one's children have been deemed 'essential' •••• The integrity of the 
family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) ("[The Court's early 
due process] decisions have respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter."). See generally Cheryl M. Browning & Michael L. Weiner, Note, The Right to 
Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach to State Removal and Tennination 
Proaedings, 68 GEO. L.J. 213 (1979). 
43 Stanley v. Dlinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944). 
44 The Supreme Court has described the state's interest in protecting the welfare of 
children as "traditional and transcendent." Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990); 
see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). See generally Marsha Garrison, OUld 
Welfare Decisionmaking: In Search of the Least Drastic Alternative, 15 GEo. L.J. 1745 
(1987). 
45 The doctrine of parens patriae originated several centuries ago in Anglo-American 
common law. Acknowledged as a part of equity jurisdiction in seventeenth century 
England, it is said to emanate from the right of the Crown to protect those of its subjects 
who were unable to protect themselves. The concept was used reportedly for the first time 
in 1696 in Falkland v. Bertie, 23 Eng. Rep. 814, 818 (1696), where it was held that with 
the dissolution of the Court of Wards, which had been established by Henry VIII in 1540, 
the "pater patriae,. responsibility of the King for the care of charities, infants, idiots, and 
lunatics returned to the Chancery. The parens patriae power was gradually expanded to 
justify court interference to protect wards from the misdeeds of testamentary guardians, 
Beaufort v. Berty, 24 Eng. Rep. 579 (1721), and later to protect a child from exploitation 
by third parties, Butler v. Freeman, 27 Eng. Rep. 204, 204 (1756). It was not until In re 
Spence, 41 Eng. Rep. 937, 938-939 (1847) that a court held that intervention to protect a 
child from his parent or guardian was proper in the absence of property. 
The parens patriae power has been recognized from earliest times in the United States 
as well and now is largely governed by state statutes. See People v. Mercein, 8 Paige 47 
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While it is generally presumed in the United States that a child's overall 
growth and development is enhanced by living with her biological parents, 46 in 
the case of abused or neglected children, the child's well-being often 
necessitates intervention by the state in the parent-child relationship. Under its 
parens patriae power, the state may remove an abused or neglected child from 
his or her parents' home and may, under certain circumstances, permanently 
terminate all relationships and rights between parent and child.47 The state's 
compelling interest in preventing harm to children justifies intrusion on the 
constitutional right to parental custody. 48 
B. Intersecting Principles in Operation 
Child welfare cases are decided under the neglect jurisdiction of juvenile 
courts nationwide. 49 These proceedings are instituted to protect children who 
(N.Y. 1839). For a detailed discussion of the historical development of the doctrine of 
parens patriae, see Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins of Parens Patriae, 21 EMORY L.J. 195 
(1978). 
46 See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("The law's concept of the family 
rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and 
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions."); see also 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, C~ARIES ON THE LAw OF ENGLAND 147 (1897) (stating that the law 
has historically recognized that the natural bonds of affection between parent and child lead 
parents to act in the best interests of their children). 
47 The Constitution requires clear and convincing evidence of actual harm to a child 
before a state may terminate a parent's right to the care, control, and custody of a child. 
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982); see In re William L., 383 A.2d 1228 
(Pa.), cert. denied, 439 u.s. 880 (1978). 
48 Stanley v. Dlinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). 
49 See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN.§ 16.1-241 (Michie 1988). 
[E1ach juvenile and domestic relations district court shall have, within the limits of 
the territory for which it is created, exclusive original jurisdiction ... over all cases, 
matters and proceedings involving ... [t]he custody, visitation, support, control or 
dispoaition of a child ..• who is alleged to be abused [or] neglected ... [w]hose 
custody, witation or support is a subject or controversy or requires determination ... 
The authority of the juvenile court to adjudicate matters involving the custody, 
visitation, support, control, or disposition of a child shall not be limited to the 
consideration of petitions filed by [a parent or legal guardian] but shall include petitions 
filed at any time by any party with a legitimate interest therein •..• 
Jd. For a general discussion of child abuse and neglect procedures, see Michael S. Wald, 
Slate ln~Dwnlion on Behalf of "Neglected,. Olildren: Standards for Removal of Olildren 
from Their Homes, Monitoring the Status of OU/dren in Foster Care, and Termination of 
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are not being adequately cared for by their parents. The juvenile court makes 
both a jurisdictional and a dispositional judgment in such cases. The court 
assumes jurisdiction based not on specific harms to the child, but on such 
descriptive criteria as observed parental behavior or apparent neglect or abuse 
of the child. Once jurisdiction is established, the court investigates the specifics 
of the case and reaches a disposition based upon the standard known as "the 
best interest of the child." If a court finds that a child has been abused or 
neglected, so the court may leave the child in parental custody, but under the 
supervision of a court-appointed guardian, or it may commit the child to the 
ParentaJ Rights, 28 STAN. L. REv. 623 (1976). 
SO Statutory definitions of "abuse" and "neglect" vary widely from state to state. The 
language of some statutes is very general, defining abuse as physical injury, sexual abuse, 
or maltreatment. For example, the VU'ginia statute states that abused or neglected child 
meana any child ••• [w]hose parents or other person responsible for his care creates or 
inflicts, threatens to create or inflict, or allows to be created or inflicted upon such child 
a physical or mental injury by other than accidental means, or creates a substantial risk 
of death, disfigurement, or impairment of bodily or mental functions ... neglects or 
refuses to provilk care necessary for his health . .. abandons such child ... [or] 
commits or allows to be committed any act of sexual exploitation or any sexual act .. . 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.1-248.2 (Michie 1995)(emphasis added). 
Others spell out with greater detail the kinds of conduct which may constitute abuse or 
neglect. For example, in Colorado child abuse or neglect 
means an act or omission in one of the following categories which threatens the health 
or welfare of a child • •• skin bruising, bleeding, malnutrilion,JaiLue to thrive, burns, 
fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, soft tissue swelling, or death ... sexual 
assault or molestation, sexual exploitation, or prostitution ... [any case in which] the 
child's parents, legal guardian, or custodian fails ••• to provide adequate food, 
clolhing, sheller, [or] medical care ••• 
COLO. REv. STAT. §19-3-303 {Supp. 1995) (emphasis added}. 
Child abuse and neglect are qualitatively different issues. Child abuse involves the 
intentional physical, mental or emotional harm a parent inflicts upon a child. Child neglect 
involves the failure of parents to properly care for the child, thereby endangering the child's 
health and well-being. It includes those circumstances in which the parents do not have 
sufficient economic means to furnish adequate food, medical care, clothing, shelter, etc. See 
also l.JNDsEY, supra note 4, at 168. 
In this Article, I focus on the neglected child and use the term "neglect" to refer to 
instances in which parents are unable to provide adequate care for their children as a result 
of indigence. 
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local child welfare agency for placement in foster care-51 if no alternative is 
available. 52 
Law and policy experts have long debated whether or not the neglect 
jurisdiction of juvenile courts should be broadened to allow for increased state 
intervention on behalf of "neglected" children.53 That continuing polemic 
exceeds the scope of this Article. However, there is substantial evidence to 
suggest that, except in cases involving very seriously harmed children, a child's 
situation is rarely improved through coercive state intervention.54 This is 
particularly true when, as is most frequently the case, intervention takes the 
form of removal from the parental home, often placing a child in a more 
51 "The term 'foster care' is [used generally] to apply to any type of care that 
substitutes others for the natural parent in the parental role, including group homes ••• and 
institutions, as well as foster family homes." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for 
Equality and Reform. 431 U.S. 816, 823 n.8 (1977). 
52 A state may coercively intervene to protect a child either by ordering that a child be 
removed from her home or by ordering her parents to accept supervision and treatment as a 
condition of continued custody. Either form of intervention is, to a greater or lesser degree, 
an intrusion on parental autonomy. 
53 Some commentators have supported broader powers for juvenile courts and 
increased intervention. See, e.g., STANLEY KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAll.. 61-62 (1971) 
(supporting increased intervention but also documenting many actual and potential abuses 
from state intervention); MAx W ALD, PROTECTIVE SERVICES AND EMoTioNAL NEGLEcr 
(1961); Henry H. Foster, Jr. & Doris J. Freed, Family Law, 34 J. AM. TRIAL LAw. Ass'N 
285 (1972). Others have criticized state intervention and advocated narrowing the reach of 
neglect laws. See, e.g., JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN liT AI..., BEFORE THE BEST INTEREsTS OF THE 
CHILD (1979); JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN liT AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTEREsts OF THE CHILD 
(1973); Robert H. Mnookin, Foster Care-In Whose Best Interests?, 43 IIARv. EDuc. REv. 
599 (1973); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Olildren: A Search 
for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985 (1975); Symposium, 1he Relationship 
Between Promise and Peiformance in State Intervention in Family life, 9 COLUM. J.L. & 
Soc. PROBS. 28 (1972). 
54 See, e.g., JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN liT AI..., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 20 
(1973) ("[S]o far as the child's emotions are concerned, interference with [parental ties], 
whether to a 'fit' or 'unfit' psychological parent is extremely painful"); see also HousE 
COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANs, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS., OVERVIEW OF THE ENTITLEMENT 
PROORAM {Comm. Print 1991); WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN, THE RIGHTS OF 
CHILDREN: REPoRt OP FORUM 22 (1970); SHELDON WHITE, FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR 
YOUNG CHILDREN: REVIEW AND REcoMMENDATIONS (1973); Michael Mushlin, Unsqfe 
Havens: 1he Case for Constitutional Protection of Foster Olildren from Abuse and Neglect, 
23 IIARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 199 (1988); Laura Oren, Deshaney~ Unfinished Business: 
The Foster Olild~ Due Process Right to &ifety, 69 N.C. L. REv. 113 (1990); Elizabeth A. 
Sammann, The Reality of Family Preservation Under Norma v. Johnson, 42 DEPAUL L. 
REv. 675 (1992); Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" OU/dren: A 
Search for ReoJistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985, 993-1000 (1975). 
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detrimental environment. 55 
Although there is a general lack of consensus as to standards establishing 
what constitutes neglect or when a court should declare a particular child as 
neglected, 56 poverty is a common characteristic of families charged with 
neglect. 57 Evidence suggests that the state routinely intercedes in poor families 
55 See supra note 54. A 1986 national survey of foster family abuse and neglect 
indicated reported cases of abuse were over ten times greater for foster children. RYAN E. 
MCFADDEN, NATIONAL FOUNDATIONCARE FOUNDATION PRomcr: PREvENTING ABUSE IN 
FAMILY FOSTER CARE (1986). 
Some experta argue that intervention may have harmful effects even when it consists of 
measures short of removal, as for example, in-home supervision. "The presence of a 
caseworker superviiing parental behavior can interfere with the psychological system of the 
family." Wald, supra note 53, at 999; see JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST 
INTEREsTS OF THE CHILD 52 (1973) (stating that a parent labeled neglectful and subjected to 
outside control and 1111pervision of parental performance, may experience "harmful and 
threatening discontinuity by leaving the decision for placement open and subject to special 
challenges •••• "). 
56 The broad range of statutory standards across the fifty states is indicative of the 
variation in neglect practices of juvenile courts. See, e.g., supra note 50. 
Generally, many experts have recommended development of rule-oriented standards 
for removal, eliminating the wide discretion currently permitted enforcers of abuse and 
neglect laws: 
Professionals have long wrestled with the problem of developing rule-oriented 
standards for child removal. Mnookin, Wald and others have argued for a standard that 
would retain the child at home unless a clear and present danger exists to the child's 
well~g. Mnookin holds that before removal occurs, evidence of physical hann must 
be demonstrated by an explanation of why intervention with the child remaining at 
home would not be possible • • • • Wald . . . has proposed that state intervention is 
legitimate in cases where the child has suffered either serious physical hann, serious 
and specifically defined emotional damage, or sexual abuse, or where the child is in 
imminent physical danger • • • . [f)he level of proof [would] vary depending upon the 
hann in question (i.e., physical abuse would require less proof than emotional damage). 
Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit ... advocate limiting the coercive arm of the state to 
those cases where the child faces "imminent risk of death or serious bodily hann." 
Advocatea of strict legal standards suggest that removal is justified only if the parents' 
past behavior ••• caused or was capable or causing "serious hann." 
LINDSEY, supra note 4, at 175; see also Wald, supra note 53. 
57 See Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and O'lild: A Reappraisal of the 
State's Role in O'liJd Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887,888 (1975). 
rrlherc is little consensus about when a court should find that a particular child is 
neglected or abused. Parents convicted on neglect in one community might never have 
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and that poor children are more likely to end up in the foster care system than 
are children of other classes.ss Reasons for the disproportionate numbers 
been brought to court in another. Perhaps the most prevalent characteristic of families 
char&cd with ne&Iect is poverty; this rai.sea the troubling possibility that class or cultural 
bias plays a significant role in decisions to label children neglected. 
ld.; Stanley S. Herr, OUJdren Wllhout Homes: Rights to Education and to Family Stability, 
45 U. MIAMIL. REv. 337, 366 (1990-91) ("Removal of children from their parents on the 
basis of homelessness or poverty alone is anathema to • • • constitutional principles and 
freedoms. Regrettably, such unlawful and unnecessary separations are a common 
occurrence."); LINDsEY, supra note 4, at 153-54. 
'Standards and statutes for the removal of a child from his or her parents are 
broad, vague, and inconsistent. 'fhere are no clear definitions of 'neglected' children 
and 'fit' or 'unfit' parents. Hence, parents, children, and foster parents are subject to a 
rule of wide discretion and subjective determination.' Our findings suggest that an 
underlying guideline does exist, although it may not be stated explicitly ••• adequacy of 
income • • • • The moat disturoing aspect of the wide discretionary power that child 
"Welfare authorities currently wield in removing children is that the results are unfair and 
discriminatory. Too often, child removal has been limited to poor families. Less than 
one fourth of the children removed from their families and placed in foster care are 
from financially self-supporting families." 
ld. (citations omitted). 
58 "[F]o&ter care has been condemned as a class-based intrusion into the family life of 
the poor ••• [The] disproportionate resort to foster care by the poor and victims of 
discrimination doubtless reflects in part the greater likelihood of disruption of poverty-
stricken families." Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 
u.s. 816, 833 (1977). 
A national study conducted in 1986 by the National Center of Child Abuse and Neglect 
found that children from families of less than $15,000 were reported to child protective 
services and other similar agencies as maltreated at five times the rate of other children. See 
Amy Sinden, In Search of Affirmative Duties Toward Ozi/dren Under a Post-DeShaney 
Constitution, 139 U. PA. L. RBv.ll7, '128 n.7 (1990); see also Herr, supra note 57, at 340 
n.10-13, 342-43. 
It has been suggested that the disparate treatment of poor families in the neglect process 
may be rooted in part in a perspective derived from its early English heritage in the 
Elizabeth Poor Law, 43 Eliz. 1 (1601). The Poor Law, a comprehensive program of 
legislation designed to provide relief to the poor, became the model for the next three 
centuries in America as well as England. It established a dual 'Standard of law for families. 
State intervention between parent and child in poor families was not only permitted but 
encouraged as a means to realize other public policy goals, ranging from the provision of 
welfare relief at moderate public cost to the prevention of crime. For other classes, the state 
would remove children from parents only in the most extreme situations and then only upon 
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One primary reason may be that definitions of neglect encompass many 
behaviors and circumstances that are direct results of poverty. 6° For example, a 
child with inadequate nutrition clothing or hygiene may be considered a victim 
of physical neglect. Neglect cases may include cases of failure to thrive-a 
condition that often reflects poverty's symptoms, such as a lack of healthy 
food, parental stress and noisy and distracting living conditions.61 Delays in 
getting immunizations or health care for a child-delays which may result from 
a lack of funds or medical insurance, a lack of transportation, or a lack of 
opportunity to reach clinics which may only be open during the parents 
working hours-are by-products of poverty that can result in a finding of 
neglect.62 
Poverty-related circumstances can put children at increased risk of harm 
from persons other than their parents which can also serve as the basis of a 
neglect finding. For example, poor working parents who cannot afford 
adequate child care may be forced to leave their children unattended or with 
inexperienced caretakers, or in other unsafe child care arrangements. 63 
Similarly, families living in inadequate housing or who are homeless are 
frequently charged with neglect. 64 
In addition, as a consequence of their greater dependency on public 
agencies for the provision of social services, the poor are subject to far greater 
privately initiated court action. See Areen supra note 57, at 894-96, 899. For a modern 
reflection of similar public policy perspectives with respect to the poor see i'!fra text 
accompanying notes 89-90. 
59 Though most poor parents provide loving, nurturing care for their children, it is true 
that coping with the stresses caused by poverty can, in the extreme, drive some parents to 
abuse or neglect their children. While the problems of child abuse and neglect exist in 
families at all income levels, studies show that such problems occur at a higher rate among 
poor families. 
According to a study of the national incidence and prevalence of child abuse and 
neglect undertaken by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Center 
on Child Abuse and Neglect in 1986, the rate of neglect for children in families with annual 
incomes below $15,000 was 36.8 per 1,000-9 times more than in higher income families 
(4.1 per 1,000). Low-income children were labeled neglected more often for neglect of all 
types, including physical, educational, and emotional neglect. See Cnn..oREN's DEFENSE 
FuND, supra note 1, at 85-86; but see supra note 57 and infra text accompanying notes 61-
65. 
60 See supra note 50. 
61 CHll..DREN'S DEFENSE FuND, supra note 1, at 87. 
62/d. 
63/d. 
64 See generally Herr, supra note 57. 
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scrutiny of their family lives than are wealthier families who have the necessary 
means to purchase private social services. Therefore, the family problems of 
the indigent come to the attention of child welfare agencies at a 
disproportionate rate. 65 
Despite statutory safeguards technically excusing parents who are unable to 
provide for their children through no fault of their own, 66 distinctions are 
seldom made in practice. State protective agencies routinely rely on neglect 
statutes to remove children from the homes of parents who are too poor to 
support them. Statutes typically define neglect primarily in terms of parental 
conduct or home environment, with no requirement for a showing of actual 
harm. 67 Consequently, the inability to provide adequate food and housing can 
trigger a neglect finding and a court-ordered removal to foster care.68 And, for 
lack of any meaningful alternative, many impoverished parents, when faced 
with unemployment, sudden homelessness, or other economic emergency, 
voluntarily surrender their children for foster care placement. 69 But whether by 
court order or voluntary placement, once a child enters foster care the parent 
relinquishes custody and the concomitant right to play an active role in 
decisions affecting the child's daily life and care.70 Further, poor families face 
particular disadvantage once they become involved in neglect or dependency 
proceedings in the juvenile court system. Their economic situation can create 
both practical and political barriers to the reunification of their families. For 
example, when children are placed in foster care, parents who rely on AFDC 
or public housing to make ends meet lose their benefits. AFDC allowances are 
terminated when children are no longer in the home. Without AFDC, a parent 
may be unable to pay rent. Or, a family that lives in subsidized housing may 
lose its placement if the children remain out of the home for an extended 
period. Without safe and stable housing, the children will not be returned to 
their parents. 71 
65 See Sinden, supra note 58, at 228 n.7. 
66 See e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §1012(t) (1995). 
67 See e.g., Jenkins v. Wmchester Social Servs., 409 S.E.2d 16 (Va. Ct. App. 1991); 
see also Wald, supra note 53, at 1000. 
68 Jd. See generally Herr, supra note 57. 
69 See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 
816 (1977). Some commentators suggest that the "coercive undertones" of so-called 
voluntary placements may lead parents to believe they have little choice but to surrender 
custody. See, e.g., Oren, supra note 54; Sammann, supra note 54. 
70 Snilh, 431 u.s. at 827. 
71 See generally Randal E. Steckel, 14 ABA Juv. & CHILD WELFARE L. REP. 138 
(1995). 
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ill. THE INTERSECTION OF PRINCIPLES AS A BASIS FOR AN 
AssiSTANCE ENTITLEMENT? 
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the manner in which the state 
exercises its parens patriae power with respect to poor children has resulted in 
the construction of policies and practices that inevitably undermine family ties 
and ultimately work to the detriment of children of impoverished families. 
Notwithstanding the importance to a child's emotional and psychological 
development derived from being raised in a stable family, 72 and irrespective of 
research documenting serious problems with the foster care system, 73 state 
child services agencies and the juvenile courts routinely rely on neglect statutes 
to remove children from the homes of impoverished parents. 74 The state 
continually intrudes on the privacy of poor families without enhancing the poor 
child's welfare.7S 
72 See generally A. LEoN HlGGINBoTHAM, JR., AMERicA'S CHILDREN AT RisK: A 
NATIONAL AGENDA R>R l.ooAL ACTION, A.B.A. PREsiDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE 
UNMET l.ooAL NEEDS OP CHILDREN AND 'fHBIR FAMILIES (1993) (describing children's 
problems in poverty, child care, housing, education, health care, child support, legal 
representation, and the juvenile justice system). 
Studies have shown that the denial of parental love and compassion can diminish the 
capacity for development of those qualities in children raised in foster care. LINDsEY, supra 
. note 4, at 58. 
73 See supra notes 54-55; see also LINDsEY, supra note 4, at 47-60. 
74 Wendy Anton Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Ozildren ~ 
Perspeaives in Law, 36 ARiz. L. REv. 11, 46 (1994). The average estimated monthly 
number of children in foster care more than doubled from 97,000 in 1982 to 197,000 in 
1991. Sammann, supra note 54, at 2; see HOUSECOMM. ONWAYSANDMEANS, supra note 
54, at 17-24. 
15 Continued reliance on foster care is likely attributable to two factors. Flrst, a child's 
stay in foster care is in theory a temporary measure until the child can be returned to live 
with his or her biological parents. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality 
and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977). In reality, short term foster care is the exception, rather 
than the rule. Children regularly remain in foster care for years at a time, often moved 
multiple times from one foster care family to another. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 72, 
at 50-51; Areen, supra note 57, at 912-14. Dispositions in neglect cases tend to overlook 
the fact that foster care frequently is not superior to family care, even in a problem family 
environment, and that many children who enter the foster care system do not eventually 
return to their parents' home. See generally LINDsEY, supra note 4, at 48-59. 
Second, public funding policies have discouraged keeping children and their natural 
parents together, at a high cost to children and their families as well as to taxpayers. As 
Judge Justine Polier described: 
[MJothers in the aid to families with dependent children (AFDC) program receive 
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The intrusion on family privacy in neglect cases is constitutionally justified 
by the state's compelling interest in protecting the welfare of children. But 
when the typical method of intervention is the removal of the child from the 
parents' care, and the effect of that intervention habitually puts the child at 
greater risk of harm, the state's action does not further its avowed purpose-
protecting the safety and well-being of children. It cannot be said to be acting 
in the child's best interest, nor to be properly fulfilling its parens patriae role. 
And, a priori, if the state's action does not protect children, but in fact 
increases the likelihood of their harm, the extent of its intrusion on family 
privacy is unwarranted. 
This is not to suggest that the state does not have a continuing 
responsibility to protect the well-being of poor children. To the contrary, since 
the state has traditionally defined its role as parens patriae as one of ultimate 
protectors of children's welfare, it is obliged in the proper exercise of that role 
to devise constructive alternatives for the protection of all children including, 
perhaps especially, those children whose parents are economically unable to 
provide for their proper care. But it is constrained in the proper discharge of 
that duty by the right of family privacy. It must develop alternative means of 
intervention that will protect the child without undermining family ties any 
further than necessary to accomplish that goal.76 It is this duty to protect the 
child when coupled with the right of family integrity that forms the basis for a 
limited theory of assistance entitlement. 
If a child is receiving inadequate food, clothing, shelter, medical care and 
the like-if the child is neglected-the state, as it has defined its parens patriae 
power, has an affinnative obligation to intervene in the family on the child's 
behalf. Interference in the family is justified if it protects the child from harm. 
Thus, the form of intervention must be based on a determination of what would 
be in the child's best interest. However, it must also be narrowly tailored so as 
to accomplish the state's objective with the least intrusion on the fundamental 
privacy right of the family unit. This balancing of competing interests requires 
on average leu than $1 a day for each child. If we find the home is inadequate, that the 
mother ia unable to cope with the problems of so many children, we remove the child to 
the home of a stranger or a series of strangers, paying from public funds up to $7 a day 
for the child's care. If the child is removed to an institution, the institution is paid up to 
$14 a day. rmally, if the child becomes emotionally disturbed, payments from public 
funds may range from $10 to $25 a day. Thus, the further the child is removed from his 
family, the more we are ready to pay for his support. 
Justine Polier, The Invisible Legal Rights of the Poor, 12 CHILDREN 215, 218 (1965}; see 
also Areen, supra note 57, at 915. 
16 Removal of a child from parental custody may be necessary in some cases, but it 
ought not be routinely employed without consideration of other forms of intervention. 
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consideration of the available alternatives. The state ought not continually 
interfere with the integrity of poor families, ostensibly for the purpose of 
protecting children from harm, by imposing an action that routinely puts such 
children at greater jeopardy. 
Since the child's interest is, presumably, best served in the care and 
custody of his or her parents, and alternatives available outside the family do 
not better protect the child from harm, 77 the state may best succeed in 
safeguarding the child's welfare by preserving the family intact and assisting it 
in achieving some measure of economic security. By so doing, the state meets 
its obligation as parens patriae in a manner that causes only minimal intrusion 
on family bonds. Thus, in the absence of a redefinition of the state's traditional 
parens patriae role, I would argue that the state has, at the very least, an 
affirmative obligation to provide some minimal assistance to poor families with 
children prior to removal of the children from their parents. For the child who 
is receiving inadequate food, clothing, shelter and medical care because of 
parental poverty, the state is compelled to intervene on its behalf, but the most 
effective and least intrusive form of intervention is likely to be economic 
assistance to the child within the family, i.e., to the family unit. 
I would argue further that since the obligation to provide assistance arises 
from the state's common law duty toward children, it indeed exists at a point 
prior to the point of removal. Other forms of intercession in the family, though 
short of removal, are nonetheless intrusive on family privacy. 78 Yet, as parens 
patriae the state is obliged to intervene to protect the neglected child. The 
method employed in satisfaction of the common law duty must be tempered by 
the constitutional constraint. The state should apply the least intrusive manner 
of intervention available that will enable it to effectively accomplish its 
objective. Arguably, in cases of neglect, the state, therefore, may be similarly 
obliged to provide some minimal economic assistance to the child within the 
family unit prior to the imposition of other more intrusive forms of intervention 
short of removal, such as in-home supervision. 
N. PARENS PATRIAE, FAMILY INTEGRITY, AND WELFARE REFORM 
What impact might consideration of the intersection of the common law 
parens patriae doctrine and the constitutional family privacy doctrine have on 
current efforts at welfare reform? Although the social welfare system has, over 
the last three decades, all but eliminated poverty among the elderly, children 
77 Studies have shown that foster care is often more dangerous than the home the 
children are removed from. I.JNDsEY, supra note 4, at 58. 
78 See supra note 55. 
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have not fared as well. Child poverty rates have remained consistently at high 
levels and have continued to escalate over time. 79 At this writing, welfare 
refonn legislation is currently under consideration in both the U.S. House and 
Senate which contain as a central component the discontinuation of the federal 
guarantee of assistance to all eligible Americans. 80 Preliminary studies indicate 
that millions of additional children could be pushed into poverty if these 
legislative initiatives are enacted in their current fonn. 81 Some states have 
begun a similar process of substantially curtailing state aid to poor families, 
likely with similar long-term effects. 82 
The prevailing view of the constitutionally protected right to family 
integrity is that it is a right to noninterference by the state in family matters 
19 See supra note 74; see also Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Towards a Post Industrial 
Social Policy, 71 FAM. INSoc'Y 51-56 {1990); LINDsEY, supra note 4, at 189-228. 
80 Current House and Senate versions of welfare reform legislation replace the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children program with a block grant, or direct cash payment, of 
federal funds to the states, thereby ending the present system under which the federal 
government matches state spending on welfare and any eligible poor person is guaranteed 
benefits. The federal government estimates that nearly a fifth of the children receiving 
benefits in 1994, or 157,000 children, would eventually be ineligible. States could deny 
cash benefits to unwed teen mothers and deny additional benefits for children born to 
women already on welfare. See Barbara Vobejda, Senate Passes Welfare Overhaul; Ointon 
Urges House to Go .Along, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1995, at A1, A4; How Congress Plans to 
Balance the Budget, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1995, at A15. 
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimates that the Senate bill, 
which also substantially restricts benefits to the elderly and disabled under the Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program, would increase by 25% the "poverty gap" i.e., the 
qualitative and quantitative extent of poverty in the nation. If enacted Congress' budget bill 
would permit only 35% of the 900,000 disabled children who currently draw full SSI 
benefits to continue to do so; 15% would be cut off entirely. See How Congress Plans to 
Balance the Budget, WASH. PosT, Nov. 21, 1995, at A15. 
There are also proposals in Congress significantly decreasing funding to the food stamp 
program. Unlike the AFDC Program or SSI, for which one must be a single mother or 
elderly or disabled, respectively, to qualify, the food stamp program is open to anyone 
whose income is low enough. It acts, in effect, as a national income floor of sorts. See Food 
~.WASH. PosT, Nov. 9, 1995, at A22; Ann Devroy, As Effect ofWelfare Rejonn Bills 
Emerge, So Do Crilics, WASH. PosT, Nov. 9, 1995, at A1, A10-All. 
81 The child poverty rate is estimated to increase from 14.6% to 16.1 %, resulting in an 
additional 1 million children below the poverty line if current versions of federal welfare 
reform bills are enacted. See Judith Havemann & Ann Devroy, Ointon Agrees to New 
Welfare Study, WASH. PosT, Oct. 28, 1995, at A4. 
82 See, e.g., SpencerS. Hsu, All Eyes on Virginia's Welfare Guinea Pig: Culpeper 
Officials Optimistic as Region Begins Governor's Effort to Overhaul the System, WASH. 
PosT, June 4, 1995, at Bl. 
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absent a compelling state interest in preventing criminal behavior83 or 
protecting children from harm. 84 It is a fundamental right that may not be 
abridged by the state without a compelling reason, even when the intent is well-
meaning. 85 But as parens patriae the government can, despite the importance 
of the rights of family privacy and parental autonomy, impinge upon those 
rights in order to protect children. It can require parents to feed, clothe, shelter 
and otherwise properly care for their children.86 A. fortiori, the responsibility of 
the parents notwithstanding, because government has traditionally defined its 
role as that of the ultimate protector of children's welfare, the state owes a duty 
to the child who, by virtue of parental poverty, receives inadequate food, 
clothing, shelter and medical care. Under current social welfare policy the state 
has offered modest assistance to some needy children through public assistance 
programs such as AFDC. But, the state has typically sought to satisfy its 
responsibility to the neglected child through intervention in the family to 
remove the child from the care of his or her impoverished parents, and to place 
him or her into foster care. Significant increases in the number of poor families 
will, undoubtedly, have a direct impact on the ability of child welfare and 
social services systems to respond to the needs of neglected children. As a 
practical matter, with nearly a half million children in an already overburdened 
and inadequate foster care system, most for reasons of poverty, and with the 
number of poor children increasing, removal of neglected children from 
parental custody to foster care can no longer be the state's primary response to 
poverty-induced child neglect. 87 From a constitutional perspective, unless 
removal of neglected children can be shown, as a general matter, to accomplish 
its purpose of enhancing the well-being of such children, such continued 
intrusion into poor families can no longer be justified. A. priori, if the state is to 
effectively satisfy its traditional obligation as parens patriae in a way that 
comports with existing family privacy doctrine, a qualitative change is called 
for in the way in which society understands and responds to poverty and in the 
way it seeks to satisfy its obligation to its children. 
The current societal approach to the needs of the poor is an outgrowth of 
83 See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
84 See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
85 See supra notes 15-16. 
86 See supra note 54. 
87 Nearly half of all foster children move from one foster home to another in the same 
year; most foster children remain in foster care until they are adults and are never returned 
to their biological parents' homes; 3% of foster children experience abuse or neglect in their 
foster families; although the number of foster care placements has been increasing, the 
number of qualified foster parents has been decreasing. CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FuND, THE 
STATE OP .AMER1CA'S CHILDREN 62-63 {1992). 
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various, often inaccurate or incomplete, assumptions including a view of 
poverty as largely a private matter-the consequence of the individual 
shortcomings of the poor. 88 This perception has allowed us to condemn the 
poor for their plight and to ignore the impact of parental poverty on children. 89 
But when millions of poor children continue to exist in an affluent society, 
society must begin to alter its view from one of poverty as a private matter to 
poverty as a civic concern. To be truly effective, any reform of the public 
welfare system must leave more children better off than under the existing 
system. Welfare policies should be designed to ensure that families, both single 
and two-parent families, possess the minimal income necessary to adequately 
care for their children. 90 Economic support for poor children cannot be 
conditioned entirely upon the actions of their parents over which they have no 
control. Though encouraging greater work force participation and self 
sufficiency are laudatory goals, public assistance programs designed to address 
88 For an interesting discussion of the conceptualization of the poor into categories of 
"deserving poor" versus "undeserving poor" for purposes of the development of public 
assistance policies and programs, see CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY 
120-203; see also supra notes 53-54. 
89 See generaJly I.JNDsEY, supra note 4, at 208-28; CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FuND, supra 
note 1, at xx-xxiv. This perception underlies current reform proposals in Congress that 
condition a child's benefit on increased labor force participation, self-sufficiency, and other 
modified parental behaviors, which has the net effect of trying to motivate the parent's 
actions by denying adequate support to the child. 
90 Chriitopher Jencks has suggested that a reasonable way to go about this would be 
through creation of a system of government financed "fringe benefits" in lieu of the existing 
welfare system. This system would concentrate on helping all parents, in both single and 
two-parent families, who work in low-wage jobs. He suggests that such a program might 
include support in the form of: extra cash to parents who work at low-income jobs through 
the Earned Income Credit, with a large credit available for families with more children; tax 
credits for childcare expenses when the parents work; universal health care insurance with 
premiums tied to income; a tax credit for housing for working parents; and, mortgage 
subsidies for working parents who buy homes in low-income neighborhoods, in order to 
stabilize those neighborhoods. JENCKS, supra note 88, at 232-35. 
A second commentator, Duncan Lindsey, has suggested a universal "guaranteed child 
exemption," available to working parents, both lone parents and couples. Working parents 
would declare the number of dependent children in their households. Based on that 
declaration, the parent, whether working full or part time, would be paid the value of the 
exemption through reduced payroll deductions. Parents who were unemployed would 
receive regular cash payments up to the value of the exemption. See I..INDsEY, supra note 4, 
at245-Sl. 
It is not the intent of this Article to formulate a proposal for welfare reform and it does 
not attempt to do 110. Further, it neither endorses nor rejects the suggested reform measures 
of the commentators described herein, but merely recounts their suggestions for the reader. 
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those objectives must not undermine efforts to alleviate child poverty in the 
attempt to promote parental self responsibility. 
V. CONCLUSION: WHY "AssiSTANCE ENTITLEMENT" TALKNOw? 
At the outset of this Article I noted that debate about a right to minimum 
assistance is not new.91 The twenty-five years since the U.S. Supreme Court's 
decision in Dandridge v. WilliaJns,92 have seen such notions largely dismissed 
as counter to traditional constitutional doctrine and philosophy. Given present 
social attitudes and the conservative makeup of the current Supreme Court one 
might reasonably doubt whether that view is likely to change in the near future. 
So, one might ask, why revisit the issue of assistance entitlements for the poor 
now and what does this Article add to the deliberations? 
To address the second part of the question first, this Article presents a new 
theoretical dimension, grounded in substantive due process and traditional 
common law doctrine, to arguments for a limited assistance entitlement. Still, 
why reconsider the entitlement issue at all? 
One answer is that the number of poor families continues to rise and no 
downturn in the numbers seems imminent. 93 Child poverty rates in this country 
are particularly alarming. 94 The costs of child poverty to society is measurable 
in terms of both human potential and real dollars.95 It is ironic that the United 
States, with one of the largest and most expensive child welfare systems in the 
industrialized world, also has one of the highest rates of child poverty. 96 If 
91 See supra text accompanying notes 13-33. 
92 397 u.s. 471 (1970). 
93 See supra note 81. 
94 Families with children are nearly 3 times more likely to be poor than families 
without children. And younger families with children (i.e., families headed by someone 
under 30) are nearly 6 times more likely to be poor than childless families overall. See 
CHILDREN'S DEFENSE FuND, supra note 1, at xx. 
95 Poverty stacks the odds against children before birth; it decreases their chances of 
being born healthy and of normal birth weight or of surviving. Low-income children are two 
times more likely to die from birth defects; three times more likely to die from all causes 
combined; four times more likely to die in fires; five times more likely to die from 
infectious diseases and parasites; and, six times more likely to die of other diseases. 
Future losses to the economy resulting from the effects of just one year of poverty for 
14.6 million children (the current estimate of the number of children living in poverty) 
reach 88 high 88 $177 billion. If the costs associated with higher rates of unemployment, 
poor worker health, and inadequate academic skills are eliminated, the estimated annual 
costs of child poverty is still between $36 billion and $99 billion. CHILDREN's DEFENSE 
FuND, supra note 1, at xvii, xix, 99-116; see supra note 72. 
96 The United States and Canada have the costliest and most extensive child welfare 
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child poverty continues unabated at its current rate, the wealth, the very future 
of this country as represented by its children, will be decimated. Thus, this 
may be a particularly propitious time to seriously reconsider our choices and 
priorities as a society. 
Perhaps another answer is one suggested by Professor Erwin 
Chemerinsky.97 It is particularly important that scholars and others continue to 
make a case for an entitlement to survival resources, especially now, because 
those views are almost entirely absent from the current Supreme Court. Our 
constitutional history demonstrates that academic writing of one era can 
influence constitutional doctrines in the next. 98 And, as Professor Daan 
Braveman suggests, apart from responses of the federal judiciary, state courts 
might be persuaded to independently find these rights under state 
constitutions. 99 
But perhaps the best rationale for reconsidering this issue is suggested by 
recalling the words of Franklin Roosevelt, "The test of our progress is not 
whether we add to the abundance of those who have much; it is whether we 
provide enough for those who have too little. "too 
systems and the highest rate of children in poverty among the industrialized nations. See 
I.JNDsEY, Sllpra note 4, at 189-228. Such high poverty rates are not an inevitable result of 
modem industrialized society. Other industrialized nations with fewer resources and similar 
economic and social problems as those of the United States have lower child poverty rates. 
American children are three times as likely to be poor as British children, four times more 
likely to be poor than French children and seven to thirteen times more likely to be poor 
than German, Dutch or Swedish children. See CHILDREN's DEFENSE FuND, supra note 1, at 
xx. 
97 See Erwin Chemerinslcy, Maldng the Qzse for a Constitutional Right to Minimum 
Entillements, 44 MERCERL. REv. 525 (1993). 
98 1d. at 526. 
99 See Braveman, Sllpra note 3. 
100 
But here is the cballenge to our democracy:-In this nation I see tens of 
millions of its citizens-a substantial part of its whole population-who at this very 
moment are denied the greater part of what the very lowest standards of today call 
necessities of life. 
I see rnillio111 of families trying to live on incomes so meager that the pall of family 
disastet' hangs over them day by day. 
I see millio111 whose daily lives in city and on fann continue under conditions 
labeled indecent by a so-called polite society half a century ago. 
I see millio111 denied education, recreation, and the opportunity to better their lot 
and the lot of their children. 
I see millions lacking the mea~~~ to buy the products of fann and factory and by 
their poverty denying work and productiveness to many other millions. 
I see one-third of a nation ill-housed, ill~Jad, ill-nourished. 
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It ia not in despair that I paint you this picture. I paint it for you in hope-because 
the nation, seeing and understanding the injustice in it, proposes to paint it out •••• 1he 
test of our progress is not whether we add to the abundance of those who have much; it 
is whether we provide enough for those who have too little. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address, (Jan. 20, 1937) in VITAL SPEECHES OF 
THE DAY (1936-37), at 227 (emphasis added). 
